History of Cantonment Wilkinson,

Pulaski County, Illinois
by   Mark J. Wagner
Center for Archaeological Investigations
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale

May, 2004

Note: This article represents a still-in-progress section (chapter 3) of a report on the archaeology and history of Cantonment Wilkinson. Incomplete or missing references within this document should be understood within that context. Any such errors will be corrected in the complete report which should be available by the summer of 2005.

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a historic context for the 2003-2004 archival and archaeological investigations at Cantonment Wilkinson. It is not intended to be an exhaustive history and readers are referred to Caldwell (1949:1-29) and Mayer (1985) for further information on the history of the cantonment. Rather, this chapter presents information on the factors behind the establishment of the post, the military units and personnel that occupied it, and its post-abandonment history. Particular emphasis is placed on archival information regarding the post that was unavailable to Caldwell (1949) at the time he wrote the first accurate history of the post. These include: (1) the letters and order book of Major Jonathon Williams, the second commanding officer of the post and later founder of the United States Military Academy at West Point and (2) papers and other documents of the Strong family that provide information on the career and death of Colonel David Strong, first commanding officer of the post.

Prelude: The Quasi-War (1798-1799)

Cantonment Wilkinson has its origins in the Quasi-War, a period (1798-1799) during which a diplomatic crisis between France and the United States resulted in armed conflict on the high seas and the distinct possibility of a land war as well (De Conde 1966). The crisis between the United States and France began with the “XYZ Affair” of 1797 in which French diplomats demanded bribes from American officials. The resultant publication and exposure of these demands strained relations between the two countries to the breaking point and the American government began preparing for war. Construction of new warships was authorized and retired president George Washington was once again offered command of the United States Army. Washington reluctantly accepted but only on the condition that Alexander Hamilton be his second-in-command.

Hamilton saw in the crisis an opportunity to expand the western boundaries of the United States by moving troops into and seizing the lower Mississippi River Valley once war broke out. Although the lower Mississippi River Valley was a Spanish rather than French possession at this time, Hamilton and others expected that the Spanish would ally themselves with the French in the event of war. Hamilton, with Washington’s permission, began drawing up plans for a “Reserve Corps” of U. S. soldiers who would carry out the mission of invading the Mississippi River valley (De Conde 1966:121-123). The need for such a corps rested on the fact that the several-thousand-man army was widely dispersed at a company level at small posts and forts scattered throughout the eastern United States in 1798. It would be necessary to bring together and concentrate a large part of the army at one base, train and supply it, and appoint a commanding officer before any invasion could take place.

Hamilton solicited advice from General James Wilkinson, then commander-in-chief of the U.S. Army, on the disposition of U.S. forces in the event of war in the fall of 1799. Wilkinson replied with a detailed plan in which he advocated the abandonment of a series of smaller posts and the concentration of a large force in the Mississippi River valley to discourage any potential invaders (Syrett 1976:xx-xx). Wilkinson proposed placing 500 infantry soldiers and two artillery companies at Ft. Adams in the Mississippi River valley as well as establishing a series of smaller posts manned only by infantry to watch for potential enemies. These posts would be supported by a larger base based farther up the river at which Wilkinson would concentrate and train most of the then-dispersed soldiers of the army. In regard to force at the large base, Wilkinson informed Hamilton that:

I deem three Regiments of Infantry, three companies of Artillery, Two Troops of Cavalry, and our two Gallies (sic), competent to the Defence of the Country, against any Force which could have been bought into Action from [our enemies in] Louisiana.

Hamilton accepted Wilkinson’s plan in general but disagreed with him on the location of the “reserve” corps intended to support Ft. Adams. In a letter to George Washington, he noted that:

I do not coincide with General Wilkinson in the disposition of the Corps de Reserve. He would have it in the neighborhood of Fort Adams (say Natches). I propose for it the vicinity of the rapids of the Ohio…[it should consist of a] Regiment and a battalion of Infantry [and] half a Company of Artillery and Two Troops of Dragoons: Let these be stationed at some convenient point at or near the Rapids of the Ohio to form an army of observation and act as exigencies may require…At to Fort Massac. This being another portal & the great outlet for the commodities of the North Western Territory [and] Kentucke (sic)…it appears to me for obvious reasons that it ought to be secured by a strong regular fortification & a respectable fortification (Syrett 1976:xx-xx, italics in original).

After conferring with Washington, Hamilton passed the plan on to Secretary of War James McHenry with the following comments:

In the event of an invasion from below, our reserved force placed on the Ohio, reinforced by the Militia, to which it would be a rallying point can descend to meet it with effect. Or can tales such other measures as circumstances may dictate. if a rupture with Spain should induce us to become the Invaders. The force assigned to the undertaking can rapidly descend the Mississippi, and being at a great distance will have a further chance of making its approach and of arriving unexpectedly—than if stationed at a place which by its nearness would excite jealously and vigilance (Syrett 1976:xx-xx).

Hamilton reiterated in this letter that the reserve corps was to be stationed in the Ohio, not the Mississippi as Wilkinson wanted, at “some point, from Cincinnati to the Rapids of Ohio” or modern-day Louisville, Kentucky. Hamilton also gave some idea of the size of the force that he had in mind for the reserve corps when he noted to McHenry that “a number of boats equal to the Transportation of Three thousand men with baggage stores provision Artillery and other apparatus” be stationed below the Falls of the Ohio for the use of this force (Syrett 1976:xx-xx).

Wilkinson apparently tried to make the case once again for locating the reserve corps farther down river than Louisville. In reply Hamilton wrote him once again on October 31, 1799 that “I only will remark that it is deemed material…that the reserve force shall not be stationed more Westward or Southward that the vicinity of the rapids of the Ohio”. In the same letter, however, Hamilton apparently sought to mollify Wilkinson by giving him permission to search for a suitable location for a new fort on the lower Ohio River intended to guard the mouths of the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers. He went on warn Wilkinson that construction of this post, which was to contain about 500 soldiers, was to be “effected by the labour of the troops” rather than by hiring civilian laborers (Syrett 1976:xx-xx).

Plans for the creation of the reserve corps continued throughout the early part of 1800. In March 1800, Hamilton noted that the force at this base was to consist of the “Second [Infantry] Regiment and a battalion of the third [Infantry Regiment]. Wilkinson may have succeeded by this time in finally persuading Hamilton that this base should be located on the lower Ohio as Hamilton noted in a later letter that “the assembling of the reserved Corps on the lower Ohio shall be deferred until Autumn (Syrett 1976b: 336, emphasis added).

Hamilton’s plans for the establishment of the reserve corps base received a series of setbacks in the summer and fall of 1800 that should have ended the project. First, George Washington died, removing Hamilton’s closest ally and friend. Second, a convention of peace was signed between the Americans and French in September 1800, ending the Quasi-War and removing the need for the reserve base. Third, Hamilton resigned his commission in the Army and returned to civilian life with the ending of the crisis. Nevertheless, plans for the construction of the base went forward for unknown reasons (Caldwell 1949:12).

Caldwell (1949:3-28), although clearly puzzled as to why plans for the cantonment continued to go forward once the crisis with France had ended, did not speculate as to what lay behind this large-scale movement of troops to the lower Ohio Valley. Mayer (1985:1-30), however, suggested that General Wilkinson might have had his own reasons for wanting to see this base established. He argued that Wilkinson, who was a notorious schemer and who is now known to have been a traitor in the pay of the Spanish, pushed the establishment of the base as part of a plot with Aaron Burr to invade the Mississippi River Valley. Burr and Wilkinson, in fact, did conspire to do this in 1806-1807 after the valley had become American territory, with Burr being apprehended and tried for treason. As Mayer (1985:xx) points out, however, the two men had been engaged in a secret correspondence using a cipher or code as early as 1800-1801, the same two years in which Wilkinson moved troops down the Ohio River and established Cantonment Wilkinson. This cipher contains symbols for the Ohio and Mississippi River valleys, military posts, and soldiers, indicating that at least some of their 1800-1801 correspondence may have concerned these subjects (Figure 4-2). Mayer (1985:20-21) speculated that the two men may have entered into a secret plot for the invasion of the then-Spanish lands of the lower Mississippi River valley in the event that Burr won the presidential election of 1800. Burr, who had accepted the position of vice-president on the Republican ticket with Tomas Jefferson as the presidential campaign, had secretly obtained the commitments of a number of the delegates to vote for him as president. In the resultant election the two men each received an equal number of delegates, with the result that the election was thrown into the House of Representatives. As Mayer (1985) noted, it precisely during the time leading up to the election and while the election was being contested by Burr and Jefferson in the House of Representatives that over 1,000 U.S. troops moved down the Ohio River to establish Cantonment Wilkinson.

A “smoking gun” in the form of a document directly linking the establishment of Cantonment Wilkinson to a secret agreement between Burr and Wilkinson has not been found. As noted by Mayer (1985:19), however, Wilkinson hinted at the existence of some sort of agreement between the two men in a pre-1807 conversation with Joseph Daveiss, the federal district attorney for Kentucky. During this conversation Wilkinson reportedly laid his hand on a map of the Spanish lands west of the Mississippi River to be traversed by the Zebulon Pike expedition and simply said “had Burr been [elected] President we would have had all this country by now” (Mayer 1985:22 Davies 1807:89-91, emphasis added).

It also is possible that the establishment of the cantonment in late 1800 represents part of the struggle between Alexander Hamilton and his “high federalist” supporters, who still hoped for a war with France, with the Adams administration which hoped for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Although a federalist, Adams was despised by Hamilton and the high federalists who actively worked against him in the 1800 election. Their goal, which was upset by Burr’s political maneuvering, was to have Adams replaced by a high federalist such as Charles Pinckney of South Carolina who would be amenable to carrying out Hamilton’s foreign and domestic policies including war with France. Among Hamilton’s supporters was Secretary of War James McHenry who had been involved with Hamilton in drawing up the plans for establishing a reserve corps of troops in the lower Ohio Valley. Adams, who regarded McHenry as a traitor to his administration, demanded his resignation in May 1800, replacing him the next month with moderate federalist Samuel Dexter (De Conde 1966:259-293). The establishment of Cantonment Wilkinson, however, which was a high federalist project continued to move forward under the new secretary suggesting that Dexter, who apparently was ill-suited to the duties of managing a large department, may have been unaware of the political significance of this base. Adams appointed Dexter Secretary of the Treasury in December 1800, with the new War Department Secretary—Henry Dearborn—not appointed until Jefferson took office in March 1801. As he had in the interval between McHenry’s resignation and Dexter’s appointment (Jacobs 1938:193), General James Wilkinson may have functioned as the acting Secretary of War until Dearborn assumed this office. Wilkinson, who had been closely linked with Hamilton’s plan to establish a reserve corps base in the Ohio Valley, may have used his temporary position to further construction of the base. In sum, given the political climate that existed in the United States in late 1800 and early 1801, the establishment of Cantonment Wilkinson may represent a high federalist project that was allowed to proceed by government officials and army officers who expected Adams to be replaced in 1801 by a more radical federalist president sympathetic to their goals of expanding the army and seeking a military confrontation with France.

Establishment of Cantonment Wilkinson

On December 1, 1800, Wilkinson requested “orders to sanction the Cantonment & c on the N.W. of the Ohio” (Letters Received xx). Various troops, however, had been moving toward this location for almost the last eight weeks. Ten companies (approximately 700 men) of the 2^nd Infantry Regiment under the command of Colonel David Strong departed Pittsburgh in 19 flatboats (14 for the enlisted men and their equipment and five for the officers), on October 8, 1800, to begin the journey down the Ohio River to the site of the new cantonment in southern Illinois (Isaac Craig Papers 23). However, this movement was immediately suspended and they were directed to camp on an island near Pittsburgh until they received orders from General Wilkinson instructing them to once again proceed down river. The soldiers suffered greatly from a lack of winter clothing during this time with the orders directing them to proceed down river once again not arriving until November 21, 1800. In a letter dated that same day Isaac Craig noted that the troops had been directed “to proceed to Fort Massac near which place the most eligible ground is to be chosen for [a] cantonment” (Isaac Craig Papers 434).

Additional troops and supplies intended for the cantonment passed through Pittsburgh in the weeks following Colonel Strong’s departure. On December 8 a flatboat carrying horses, wagons, and fodders departed for the cantonment. Three weeks later on December 24, Captain Samuel Eddings Company of the 2^nd Artillerists and Engineers under the acting command of Lt. John Leybourn set out for the cantonment in three flatboats that also contained “a considerable quantity of clothing” (Isaac Craig Papers 3, 176, 177). Eddings himself apparently had resigned from the Army prior to the start of this journey, with Wilkinson recommending to the War Department on February 6, 1801 that his resignation be accepted (Letters Received xx).

The artillery intended to accompany this and other artillery detachments that eventually would be stationed at the cantonment apparently was being assembled at Pittsburgh in December and January of 1801. On January 2, 1801, Quartermaster General Isaac Craig noted in a letter that may have referred to some of this armament:

With respect to the cannon—ten 24 pounders and three 12 pounders were some time ago delivered, and this day eight 12 pounders and eight 9 lbers (sic) have arrived—all of which the General directed me to have mounted without delay (Isaac Craig Papers 31).

The troops under the direct command of Colonel Strong reached southern Illinois in early January 1801. Patrick Gass, then a sergeant in Captain Ross Bird’s Company of the 1^st Infantry Regiment, recalled that they had “descended the Ohio in Flatboats, passed the Falls [at Louisville] on Christmas day and landed at Wilkinsinville (sic), where they wintered in tents and huts” (Jacob 1859:31). In a letter written in Pittsburgh on February 13, 1801, Isaac Craig noted that he had been informed that:

Col. Strong and the Troops under his command encamped on fine ground below Fort Massac on the banks of the Ohio all hands employed in constructing a new Town to be named Wilkinsonville (Isaac Craig Papers, n.d.: 74).

The comments of Gass and Craig provide some information on the physical appearance of Cantonment Wilkinson at the time that it was established. First, that it was intended from the start to be an encampment and not a fortified outpost similar to nearby Ft. Massac. Second, that the troops initially were housed in tents but immediately began constructing log huts. The supplies carried by Colonel Strong’s troops to the cantonment from Pittsburgh included literally thousands of woodworking tools including felling axes to clear the land broad axes, saws, froes, carpenters planes, files, and other tools needed to construct the post buildings and “6 Boxes Window Glass” for buildings (Isaac Craig Papers nod: xx). Craig’s comment that the troops were “constructing a new Town to be called Wilkinsonville” apparently refers to the hundreds of log huts needed to house the soldiers rather than an actual civilian town. His use of the term “Wilkinsonville” is the first reference to the post by this name. In a later letter written by Captain Ferdinand Claiborne on March 14, 1801, the post is referred to by its full name of “Cantonment Wilkinson-ville” (Moyers 1931: 84). In most official correspondence, however, the post was simply called the “cantonment” or the “cantonment on the Ohio”.

It is not entirely certain what regiments, companies, detachments, and soldiers Colonel Strong had under his command or how long these various units remained at the cantonment. The troops that accompanied Colonel Strong down river from Louisville in December 1800 were augmented by additional soldiers who continued to arrive throughout the first six months of 1801 while some troops already at the cantonment clearly departed for other posts. Caldwell (1949:20-21) believed that the bulk of the troops stationed at the cantonment in early 1801 belonged to the 2^nd Infantry Regiment. He also noted, however, that some 3^rd and 4th Infantry soldiers as well as “some smaller detachments of artillerists and engineers” also appeared to be present. Caldwell also suggested that the post reached its maximum strength of eleven infantry companies and one detachment of artillery or about 900 men in July 1801 (Table 3-1). Mayer (1985:6), however, suggested that from March to August 1801, Cantonment Wilkinson might have contained as many as 20 companies of infantry and artillery or approximately 1,400 men.

Mayer’s estimate, which is based on a wider review of archival sources than that of Caldwell (1949), is clearly the more accurate of the two. The present study was able to identify the presence at Cantonment Wilkinson of all of the units listed by Mayer with two exceptions—Benjamin Lockwood’s Company of the 4^th Infantry Regiment and James Read’s Detachment of the 2^nd Artillerists and Engineers. We assume that Mayer identified the presence of these units at Cantonment Wilkinson based on archival sources that we were unable to locate rather than his list being in error. In addition, we identified one company—Captain Johnson’s Company of the 4^th Infantry Regiment—that did not appear on Mayer’s 1985 list.

Confusion exists in regard to the exact number of companies present at Cantonment Wilkinson at any one time due to changes in commanding officers of various companies as well as the transfer of some companies and men from the 1^st to 2^nd Infantry Regiments. For example, various documents appear to indicate that parts or all of three 1^st Infantry companies—Daniel Bissell’s, Ross Bird’s, and Francis Claiborne’s—were present at Cantonment Wilkinsonville in early 1801. Neither Ross Bird, however, nor any of his officers accompanied the company bearing his name to Cantonment Wilkinson. Instead, the highest-ranking man in the company was a sergeant. The absence of company officers suggests that another 1^st Infantry officer, most likely Lt. Francis Claiborne, was in acting command of this company when it arrived at Cantonment Wilkinson in January. Claiborne was promoted to captain in February 1801, apparently taking command of Bird’s old company. If this scenario is correct, only two 1^st Infantry Regiment companies—Bird’s (Claiborne’s) and Daniel Bissell’s—actually were present at the cantonment.

The absence of company officers suggests that Bird’s (later Claiborne’s) company may have been brought to Cantonment Wilkinson to provide replacements for various 2^nd Infantry companies that needed additional men. A similar situation may have existed in regard to Daniel Bissell’s company. Daniel Bissell was never present at the cantonment and his company, which contained only a single officer in the form of Lt. Moses Hook, again may have been brought to Cantonment Wilkinson to provide replacements for the 2^nd Infantry.

Whatever the reason for his absence, the missing Captain Bird was assigned a new company in mid-summer 1801 to replace the one at Cantonment Wilkinson that had been given to Claiborne. Bird had been ordered to build a new military road between Lakes Ontario and Erie as part of a plan developed by Secretary of War Henry Dearborn to strengthen the defense of that area (Hay and Werner 1941:191-192). In accordance with this plan, Wilkinson issued an order in Pittsburgh on June 27, 1801, directing Bird to “report for the necessary orders to transport his own, Claiborne’s, & Sterret’s Companies to Franklin and (if the water should not serve) to Le Beouf”. Quartermaster General Isaac Craig referred to this troop movement in two letters he wrote in Pittsburgh in early July 1801:

Captain Bird with a detachment of first Regt. Inf. And Captain Sterrit's comp. Of first Regt. Artillerists, marched from hence for Le Beouf on the 8^th inst…[he is to] cut a road from thence (Le Beouf) to Presque Isle [at Erie, Pennsylvania] (Isaac Craig Papers 75, 76).

Claiborne and Hook, both of whom were still at Cantonment Wilkinson, were ordered by Wilkinson to travel north to join Bird. The order, which Wilkinson issued when he arrived at Cantonment Wilkinson for a visit on July 30, referred only to these two officers and not to the two 1^st Infantry companies—Bird’s (Claiborne’s) and Daniel Bissell’s—that they had commanded since January. Instead, Wilkinson ordered the men in that part of Claiborne’s company stationed at the cantonment to be transferred to various 2^nd Infantry companies as Colonel Strong saw fit. Wilkinson also transferred Daniel Bissell’s company to the 2^nd Infantry, putting it under the command of Captain John Visscher. He then ordered Claiborne and Hook, neither of who had any troops under their command at this point, “to join [Captain Bird and] their Regiment by the shortest and most convenient Route”. Three days later he ordered Colonel Strong to “furnish a crew to the Boat…to convey Captain Claiborne & Lieut. Hook…up the River”. Claiborne and Hook were allowed to retain their servants (probably one enlisted man each) for this journey, again indicating that they were leaving their former companies behind (Wilkinson Order Book).

It also is uncertain to what extent the 3^rd Infantry Regiment actually was represented at the cantonment. Although various officers from this regiment passed through the cantonment at various times, these men may have been on detached duty. Captain Samuel Vance, for example, may have been present at the cantonment in early 1801 in his official capacity as “Acting Clothier General to the Western Army”. His company appears to have been stationed at Ft. Washington (Cincinnati) in both late 1800 and late 1801 although it is possible that it could have moved to the cantonment at some point between these dates. The only known reference “Vance’s Company” at Cantonment Wilkinson, however, occurs in a July xx order issued at the cantonment in which General Wilkinson transferred two men of the 2^nd Infantry to that Company. This transferal, however, does not prove that the company was there at that time, but merely that transferal took place at this location. Five 3^rd Infantry lieutenants—Callender, Seymour, Hylton, Heald, and Brevoort—also were present at the cantonment from August to October 1801. These men, however, may have been on detached duty as no references have been found to troops being under their command.

The situation with the artillery units is also unclear. Units that appear to have been present at the cantonment by late July 1801, include Edding’s (Hancock’s) and Livingston’s companies (Table 4-1). A large amount of artillery ordnance was dispatched to Cantonment Wilkinson on July 1-8, 1801, in anticipation of the arrival of General Wilkinson and Major Jonathan Williams of the artillery. These included one 9 pound cannon one 12 pound cannon two 6 pound brass cannons two 3 pound brass cannons 40 barrels (4,000 pounds) of gun powder gun carriages and hundreds of different types of round, case, grape—and possibly shrapnel—shot (Isaac Craig Papers 217, 219). At this same time, additional artillery units were sent to the cantonment to receive instruction from Major Williams, a leading authority on the science of artillery. On May 8, 1801, orders were dispatched from Pittsburgh ordering Captain Livingston of the 2^nd Artillerists and Engineers to proceed to Ft. Adams on the Mississippi River and “relieve Captain Sterret & his Officers” (James Wilkinson Order Book 325). Livingston’s Company is mentioned in Major William’s order book as being present at the cantonment in August, 1801, suggesting they may have stopped at the cantonment to receive instruction from the major before preceding down river to Ft. Adams (Major Williams Order Book xx). Part of Sterret’s artillery company, which had been ordered to move from Ft. Adams on the Mississippi to Pittsburgh to join Ross Bird’s road building expedition, also appears on an August 2, 1801, payroll abstract for Cantonment Wilkinson (Table 3-2). What this suggests is that—similar to the situation with Captain Claiborne’s and Daniel Bissell’s companies—only Captain Sterret and his officers proceeded to Pittsburgh, leaving behind the men of their company at Cantonment Wilkinson which they would have passed on their way. An indication that this was the case is that no reference to Captain Sterret or his officers occurs in Major William’s order book from August to October 1801. This same order book, however, contains orders issued in September and October 1801, regarding the court-martial and punishment of two privates from Sterret’s company. Again, this suggests that at least some, if not all, of the enlisted men of Sterret’s company were left behind at the cantonment in mid-summer 1801 (Jonathan Williams Order Book xx). Finally, Captain Theodore Menninger, 2^nd Artillerists and Engineers, departed Pittsburgh with “a detachment of artillery” bound for Cantonment Wilkinson on November 24, 1801, indicating that he and his company probably arrived at the post in December of that year. How long they were stationed there is unknown. Bearing in mind the confusion caused by these transfers and troop movements, there appear to have been a maximum of 21 companies, possibly containing about 1,500 men, present at the post when it reached its peak strength in the mid-summer of 1801 (Table 3-1). This estimate assumes that all of the companies were at or near their full strength of 70 men and the various artillery and engineer detachments also were company-size in strength.

An even larger force than the 21 identified units may have been scheduled to move to Cantonment Wilkinson in 1801. This surmise is based on the fact that “40 Blank Company books” used to record the ranks, names, ages, and other characteristics of the men in the various companies formed part of the cantonment supplies consigned to Colonel Strong in October 1800 (Isaac Craig Papers 171). This was almost twice as many books as Colonel Strong actually needed for the 21 companies that eventually formed part of the forces at the cantonment. One possibility is that Colonel Strong expected that the new cantonment would be occupied for a long period of time with the various companies gradually replacing their old books with new ones as the original books wore out or became full. He also may have had orders to distribute the extra books to army units already located in Tennessee and the Mississippi River valley. The possibility also remains, however, that Colonel Strong may have expected that additional companies would arrive at the cantonment at some point in 1801 who would require the remaining 19 company books. If so, again assuming 70 men to a company, the projected force for Cantonment Wilkinson may have been as many as 2,800 men. This number is very close to the 3,000-man force Alexander Hamilton proposed for the reserve corps base in 1799 (FIND REFRENCE)

In addition to the infantry and artillery soldiers, the post order books and other documents indicate that an unknown number of “dragoons” also were present at the post by mid-summer of 1801. Dragoons essentially were mounted infantry soldiers who carried infantry instead of cavalry weapons. The use of horses gave them greater mobility and allowed them to pursue mounted Indians or other enemies who could otherwise easily escape from foot soldiers. In military engagements, however, the dragoons typically dismounted and fought on foot using infantry tactics. The U. S. Army did not contain either dragoon or cavalry units in 1800-1801 and the presence of dragoon units at the cantonment is somewhat of a mystery. In the fall of 1799, however, Alexander Hamilton, had specifically stipulated that he wanted the reserve base to contain “Two Troops of Cavalry” even though the army contained no cavalry or dragoon units at that time. Wilkinson appears to have used his own authority to create these units by simply transferring soldiers out of existing infantry and artillerist and engineer units into the new dragoon companies. An indication that this was the case is that Wilkinson issued orders in June 1801, returning a number of the dragoons to their original infantry and artillerist and engineer units (Wilkinson Order Book 338).

As noted by Caldwell (1949) and Mayer (1985), a number of civilians also lived at or near the post including women and children. Women present at the post clearly included some officer’s wives, most particularly Chloe Strong who was the wife of Colonel Strong. Some enlisted men also may have had their wives and children present although the army did not provide for the care of such individuals at this time. Other women worked as laundresses for the various companies manning the post. On June 27, 1801, General Wilkinson authorized the hiring of such laundresses in an order that stipulated:

Four women only are allowed to a Company, and they are to wash for the men & Officers, at such prices as the Colonels Commanding Regiments may prescribed, they are to be punctually paid, and will receive one ration per day for subsistence (Wilkinson Order Book 339).

Applying the ratio of four laundresses to one company to the estimated 21 companies manning Cantonment Wilkinson reveals that over 80 laundresses probably were present at the post in early 1801. In addition, when illness struck the post in the summer of 1801 an unknown number of women also found official employment as “matrons” or nurses in the post hospital (Jonathon Williams Order Book xx). Other non-military personnel included civilians living on the fringes of the post who sold supplies including whiskey to the soldiers. The army punished one such civilian liquor seller by tying two liquor bottles around his neck and drumming him out of the cantonment in September 1801. In addition to these Euro-American civilians, a village of Cherokee Indians lived directly opposite the post on the Kentucky shore of the Ohio River. Orders issued by General Wilkinson forbidding anyone to land on the Kentucky side of the river suggests that the soldiers were forbidden to visit this village.

The history of the post from January to July 1801 is incompletely known due to the apparent loss of Colonel Strong’s order books, which would have contained detailed information on the daily operation of the post. Other archival sources indicate, however, that large quantities of military equipment, provisions, and other supplies continued to arrive at the post during this time (Caldwell 1949:3-29).

The two-armed galleys mentioned in Alexander Hamilton’s 1799 letter as forming part of the reserve corps also most likely arrived at the cantonment in early 1801 (Syrett 1976:xx-xx). The construction of these two vessels—the Senator Rossand President Adams—had been authorized by Congress in 1798 as part of a series of ten new galleys or small gunboats intended for use on both the ocean and inland rivers. Galleys were small sailing vessels that contained rows of oars that “permitted large crews to move the vessel in a calm by means of long sweeps or oars, each worked by a number of men” (Chapelle 1949:51). Surviving plans reveal that the 45 ft long by 13 ft wide river galleys had a series of rowing hatches on their sides and possessed two Mediterranean-style lateen-rigged or triangular sails mounted on two angled masts. Armament consisted of a single 18 lb cannon in the bow and four 3 lb brass howitzers or swivels mounted on stocks and along the after rail and on the stern (Chapelle 1949:151-153). Each boat had 30 rowing oars of different lengths as well as rowing benches that were constructed in such a manner that they could be folded up and put away when not in use. The two boats were constructed in 1798 and 1799 with General Wilkinson being present at the May 19, 1798, launching of the Senator Ross. The President Adams, in contrast, was not completed and launched until March of the following year (Baldwin 1941:163-164). Captain Daniel Bissell, whose company later formed part of the Cantonment Wilkinson garrison, sailed the Senator Ross down the Ohio River to Ft. Massac in May 1799. He remained in command of the boat until September 1799, when he received orders to join the 1^st Regiment in New Orleans (Zell 1971:80). It is unclear if Bissell’s company of soldiers accompanied him on the voyage down the Ohio although it is likely they did, forming part or all of the rowers needed to power the boat. This would explain the presence of these 1^st Infantry soldiers, without Bissell, at Cantonment Wilkinson in early 1801. The arrival date of the President Adams is unknown although it clearly was present at Cantonment Wilkinson by late summer, 1801 (Jonathon Williams Order Book xx).

On March 13, 1801, the cantonment suffered severe damage from a tornado that crossed over the post on a diagonal (Moyers 1931: 84). The damage caused by the tornado was described in a letter written by Captain Ferdinand Claiborne that was reprinted in a number of newspapers:

Indiana Territory, Cantonment Wilkinson-Ville, March 14, 1801. Sir:--It is my duty (although but too well known to you) to report that yesterday evening between the hours of 4 and 5 o’clock, a dreadful tornado visited our camp it came in a S.W. direction accompanied with a torrent of rain taking along a skirt of the quartermaster’s camp, and in an oblique on the N.E. over our encampment, tearing trees up by the roots, and carrying all before it, destroying a great quantity of our equipage and clothing, which is not yet accurately ascertained, and though painful to relate, by the falling of the trees, has maimed and killed some of our soldiers, of which the following is a statement, Total killed—one Sergeant. Total wounded—one Captain, four Lieutenants, two Quarter-Master Sergeants, two Sergeants, one Corporal, one musician, and twenty-nine privates. One woman killed and several wounded. Names of officers wounded: Captain Lukens, badly, Lieutenants Webster, Laybourn, and Shires. Lieutenant Hooker’s leg broken, and others badly wounded.

I have the honor to be respectfully.

Your most obedient servant,

Ferdinand L. Claiborne

N.B.—Several of the boats are destroyed, particularly the Quarter-Master General’s

Additional information regarding the tornado is contained in a letter written in Pittsburgh by Isaac Craig on April 1, 1801. Craig wrote that he had “just received Information from the cantonment near Massac of a Tornado that took place on the 13 March by which much injury has been done to their buildings etc. and that by the falling of trees Several men have been killed and others much hurt” (Isaac Craig Papers 46). The War Department also noted that it had received a letter on May 1, 1801, from General Wilkinson describing the effects of the “Tempest at the Cantonment” (Records Group xx: 323). Captain Jesse Lukens, the wounded captain from the 2^nd Infantry Regiment, died of his injuries on May xx at the cantonment (Caldwell 1955:102-103) and apparently was buried in the post cemetery. Lt. Moses Hooke (not Hooker) of the 1^st Infantry recovered from his broken leg and continued in the army. Hooke and Meriwether Lewis previously had served together in the 1^st Infantry and Lewis apparently held a high regard of his abilities. In late July 1803, Lewis offered him co-command of the expedition to explore the newly acquired Louisiana Purchase in the event that William Clark declined (Dillon 1988:57-58). Clark, however, accepted. If not, the Lewis and Clark Expedition may have gone down in history as the “Lewis and Hooke Expedition”.

An unspecified fever-related illness that most likely was a combination of dysentery and malaria began to plague the cantonment troops in the spring of 1801, only a few months after the establishment of the post. General Wilkinson informed the War Department on June 1, 1801, that Colonel Strong had informed him on “25 April that the troops are sickly [and there is a] Want of Hospital Stores, Clothing, etc.” Why Wilkinson waited almost five weeks to inform the War Department of this serious situation is unclear but he may have feared that he would receive orders to evacuate the cantonment to protect the health of the soldiers. His June 1 letter may have been prompted by the fact that the illness at the cantonment had become public knowledge by early June following the appearance of a story about it in a Cincinnati newspaper. The Secretary of War, who had seen the newspaper article but apparently had not received Wilkinson’s June 1 letter, wrote him on June 11 with exactly the sort of instructions that Wilkinson apparently feared receiving:

Dear Sir:

I observe in the paper published at Cincinnati an account that our troops at the Cantonment near the mouth of the Ohio are becoming sickly, and altho’ I do not place entire confidence in that account, I fear there is much truth in it. To continue Troops in such an unhealthy position, or in one the healthfulness of which is even problematical, would, unless some important public advantage might result from such occupancy, with propriety be considered sporting with men’s lives: and as I know of no object of sufficient magnitude to justify the risk of a single life, to be obtained by the continuance of Troops at the Cantonment, I must request you to give the necessary orders for their removal up the Cumberland River to some healthy position as soon as may be. The men, I presume may, principally, march from the Mouth of the Cumberland and may move on moderately so as to be accompanied by their Baggage by water.

Col. Orr should be notified of the Intended movement and directed to be prepared to furnish provisions, and Tents may be forwarded from Pittsburgh for the use of the Troops. It may be proper to leave a small party at the Cantonment to take care of such public and private property as may necessarily be left there: this party may perhaps ultimately be sent to the Tennessee, when the work on the road shall progress (Wilkinson Papers Chicago Historical Society).

Wilkinson appears to have received this letter shortly after it had been written. In response, he informed the War Department on June 19 that he “had ordered Tents [sent] to the Cantonment [and that] no serious difficulty will arise from removing the troops thence up the Ohio or Tennessee [Rivers]. The Cumberland will be too low: Some high healthy position on the Ohio, [or] Tenn. [is] preferred. It is not expected that the Indians will oppose the movement (Records Group xx ). On June 26 he further noted that he would “proceed immediately…by way of the Cantonment” to a treaty meeting with the Chickasaw and that he had purchased medical and hospital stores for the cantonment. He also inquired about hiring two doctors, possibly for service at the cantonment (Records Group xx).

Despite his apparent compliance, Wilkinson appears to have delayed abandoning the cantonment until after he made a visit to the post in late July 1801, at least six weeks after he received the Secretary’s order. On July 23, 1801, Wilkinson, who was traveling down the Ohio in his own private barge, wrote the Secretary of War from Louisville that he received favorable “accounts of the health [of the troops] at the Cantonment” (Records Group xx). Wilkinson, who almost certainly received reports from various officers traveling to and from the cantonment during this time, must have known that this was an untrue statement. The cantonment, however, with its garrison of approximately 1,500 men was at that time the largest military post in the country and Wilkinson appears to have been unwilling to abandon it until he personally inspected it. Major Jonathan Williams of the 2nd Artillerists and Engineers, a nephew of Benjamin Franklin and the leading authority of his day on military fortifications and artillery science accompanied Wilkinson. Williams, a middle-aged man who had just joined the army in order to receive practical experience with field artillery units, also was being groomed by Wilkinson to become the first superintendent of the proposed military academy at West Point.

Wilkinson and Williams arrived at the cantonment on July 29, 1801. The post appears to have reached its maximum strength of approximately 1,500 men at this time as additional units were dispatched to the cantonment in anticipation of Wilkinson’s visit. Various records indicate that all of the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, and 4^th Infantry Regiment companies listed under “present study” in Table 4-1 were present at this time. Also present were at least three artillery units consisting of Hancock’s, Sterret’s and Livingston’s detachments. The 4^th Infantry troops consisted of 1st Battalion (or five companies) under the command of Colonel Thomas Butler who had departed Ft. Southwest Point in Tennessee in late June (Smith 1993:58). These troops apparently had been brought to the cantonment prior to attempting to open a road in Tennessee with the permission of the Cherokee. The 4^th Infantry companies remained at Cantonment Wilkinson for approximately one month, departing on August 8, 1801 “for distant command” (Wilkinson Order Book 1801). While at the cantonment, Butler soon found himself engaged in one of the most famous incidents of the period when he protested an order from Wilkinson to cut his Revolutionary War-style hair.

Despite Wilkinson’s optimistic letter of June 26, he found so many sick soldiers at the cantonment that he immediately authorized the construction of a tent hospital and the hiring of female matrons:

The sick to be removed to the Hospital as soon as possible, Matrons to be employed, Tents & Blankets to be issued for their Accommodation, and such further arrangements to be adopted for their comfort and care as Dr. McCroskey may think necessary (Wilkinson Order Book xx).

Wilkinson also issued orders that the sick be moved near the spring and be furnished by the post commissary with fresh food each day. In addition, he finally began complying with the Secretary of War’s orders from almost two months before regarding the need to abandon the cantonment. On August 1 he began preparing for this movement by instructing Colonel Strong to send an officer to “(the) Tennessee (River) to examine for water and ground for an encampment in that vicinity”. The following day he wrote a letter to the War Department describing the “Sickness of the troops…[and that] Hospital Stores [were] wanting” at the cantonment (Records Group xx).

Wilkinson appears to have departed the cantonment on August 4, 1801, for treaty negotiations with the Cherokee in Tennessee. Colonel Strong was left in command of the post with Major Williams in charge of the artillery units. On August 20, 1801, Colonel Strong died after falling from his horse and was buried a few days later at the cantonment (Strong Family Papers n.d: 4). His fall may have been caused by a stroke as Wilkinson later reported to the War Department that Strong had died of an ”acute nervous affection which rendered an almost immediate insensibility…. [different from that] ascribed to the climate or to the causes which have affected [the other soldiers at the cantonment]”. Wilkinson took advantage of the opportunity created by Strong’s death to shift the blame for the continued occupancy of the unhealthy cantonment from himself to the deceased colonel. In a September 8 letter reporting Strong’s death Wilkinson truthfully reported that “early in the past month I gave Col. Strong positive orders to remove the Troops, if the disorders of the place did not decease, but his confidence in the salubrity of the position, induced him to ascribe their Maladies to accidental causes, and he paused when he perhaps should have operated”. He failed to mention, however, that he himself had been evading a direct order to abandon the cantonment since early June. Wilkinson went on to damn the dead colonel with faint praise, referring to him as a man of “defective education, and limited Talents” whose “ingenuity, zeal, courage, and personal services [nevertheless] makes his loss a serious one” to the country (records Group 112).

Command of the 2^nd Infantry passed to Major John Buell who appears to have remained at the cantonment only long enough to attend Colonel Strong’s funeral on August 22. That same day he dispatched a letter to General Wilkinson in Tennessee, informing him of Strong’s death and that he planned to evacuate most of the troops from the cantonment. Buell and most of the 2^nd Infantry then headed eastward to the mouth of the Tennessee River, arriving there by September 4. Left behind at the cantonment under the command of Major Jonathan Williams were the sick that could not be moved one company (Greaton’s) of the 2^nd Infantry and Sterret’s and Hancock’s artillerist and engineer companies. The survival of Williams’s order book provides detailed information on the operation of the post from August 23 to October 10, 1801. Williams apparently believed that the illness at the post was due in large part to unsanitary conditions that Colonel Strong had failed to correct. He reassured the remaining soldiers that he would address this problem noting:

[The major] is fully impressed with the importance of his duty, especially as it relates to the health of the Troops, he assures the sick that he way pay the most pointed attention to all their wants and he hopes to have the great satisfaction of seeing their health restored. He has taken measures to prevent diseases by cleansing every part of the Cantonment, and as the diminution of the number of Troops will necessarily diminish the quantity of filth, he trusts in a short time this place will be as health as any within one hundred miles of it (Williams Order Book 1).

Williams promptly issued a series of orders directing the soldiers and civilians to clean up the post. The soldiers were ordered to tear down and burn a number of dried-out “bowers” or lean-to type structures that they apparently rested under during the day sick women and children were ordered to see the post doctor and fires were to be built in front of the company huts every evening “to purify the air and destroy vermin” with the huts themselves being washed and having their bedding exposed to the air once a week. In addition, Williams ordered that “three non-commissioned officers and thirty men will be detached to sweep around the outsides of the huts to the Chain of Centinels [i.e., sentries] where all the filth is to be burnt” once a week. Any trash that could not be burned was ordered to be buried. In addition, Major Williams ordered the construction of new privy vaults within the ravines cutting through the cantonment so that heavy rains would wash away the waste (Williams Order Book 1, 12-13, 19).

Dr. McCroskey, the post doctor, appealed to Williams the day after he took command to provide additional supplies for the “Hospital department”. McCroskey, in an apparent reference to the recently deceased Colonel Strong, noted that he had requested such items in the past “but am sorry to observe [my requests] have not been regarded”. The items he needed consisted of basic kitchen supplies for the sick including coffee pots, tin plates and cups, water buckets and “60 blankets, but only 30 of which have been received” (McCroskey August 24 1801).

The troops under William’s command spent their time variously policing the cantonment, carrying out guard duty, repairing the boats in the cantonment boat yard and taking care of the sick in the hospital. They also spent a large amount of time drilling on the parade ground in anticipation of the return of General Wilkinson in October. Boats left the cantonment on almost a daily basis for the new encampment at Smithland near the mouth of the Tennessee River to which Major Buell and most of the garrison had moved. The boats carried supplies, convalescent soldiers, and letters to the encampment, returning with orders from Major Buell as well as additional sick soldiers. Major Buell instructed Williams to have all the boats at the cantonment repaired, as they would be needed to carry General Wilkinson and a group of commissioners to treaty meetings with the Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw Indians.

During the seven weeks that he commanded the cantonment Major Williams found it necessary to convene a series of court martials to deal with various petty crimes committed by the enlisted men and non commissioned officers of the post including disobeying orders, fighting, stealing, and drunkenness. Such crimes were not exclusive to Cantonment Wilkinson but occurred throughout the frontier army of the early nineteenth century as bored enlisted men in remote posts found various ways to get into trouble. Williams variously sentenced the guilty parties to extra fatigue (i.e., kitchen) duty if corporals or sergeants, to be reduced in rank to private to be flogged or whipped on the back anywhere from 10 to 50 times in front of the assembled garrison or to “ride the wooden horse”. Flogging sentences were carried out using a “cat of nine tails”, a wooden-handled whip in which nine knotted hemp strands formed the actual whip (Moore and Haynes 2003:52-52). Williams handed out the most severe flogging sentences—40 to 50 lashes—to men found guilty of stealing and repeated drunkenness.

Flogging, which could tear a man’s back open, may have been a less severe sentence in some instances than “riding the wooden horse”. This punishment consisted of having the prisoner set astride a wooden sawhorse with an angled rather than flat top for anywhere from 10 to 15 minutes with a cannon ball tied to each leg. On September 14 a court martial sentenced Private Kelly of Captain Menninger’s company to ride the “wooden horse for the space of ten minutes with one six pound ball tied to each leg” as punishment for stealing vegetables from a company garden. Maj. Williams confirmed the sentence and ordered it carried out “tomorrow morning on the grand parade at Guard mounting”. On September 22 Private Grinter of the same company was sentenced to ride the wooden horse for 15 minutes as punishment for “repeated drunkenness“ and disturbing the rest of the sick while drunk. Williams also meted out punishments to civilians living on or near the post. On the same day that Grinter was punished, and possibly as part of the same case, private citizen John Arberion was tried by a court-martial for selling whiskey to the soldiers. Found guilty, he was ordered to be “drummed round the cantonment with a Bottle suspended from his neck and not permitted to reside at or near Wilkinsonville” (Jonathan Williams Order Book xx).

On September 5 1801, Major Buell directed Captain Russell Bissell to dispatch a boat to the cantonment containing a severely wounded former soldier who had been found floating in a canoe on the Ohio River. Indians living near Vincennes had apparently tortured this man, after which they set him afloat on the Ohio. His injuries were severe enough that Buell informed Major Williams that he anticipated that the surgeon at the cantonment would have to amputate one or more of his limbs:

I have sent down a poor object, and an old Soldier, his situation I think will excite your pity he was found a few Days since in a small canoe floating down the Courant (sic) by himself. It appears that this poor Creature was put in that predicament by the Savage Inhabitants near Vincennes in order that he might Float off their hands. I have ordered him taken care of since my Arrival and presume you will do the same at Wilkinson Ville, as the Doctor says he must be removed at that place, being an object for the Amputating instruments there (Buell September 4, 1801:1).

Captain Russell Bissell then ordered Sgt. Bolt to take charge of the party carrying the wounded man to the cantonment noting that:

You have an object of Charity [in your care], which Doctr. Davis will point out. You will see that he is tenderly used, and Humanely treated on the passage [to the cantonment] (Bissell September 5 1801).

General Wilkinson used Cantonment Wilkinson in October 1801, as a rendezvous for government officials, boats, troops, presents, and supplies intended for treaty negotiations he conducted with the Chickasaw and Choctaw at Chickasaw Bluffs near Natchez later that month. Wilkinson clearly had planned to use the cantonment for this purpose as early as August 20 when he had ordered Colonel Strong to “have one boat in proper condition for the reception [of] Governor Claiborne & his Family about the 1^st of October” (Wilkinson August 20, 1801). As he had done during his August visit. Wilkinson once again held a military review at the cantonment. As part of this, the 2^nd Infantry companies stationed at the mouth of the Tennessee under the command of Major Buell broke camp and accompanied Wilkinson back to the cantonment, arriving there by October 13. In a letter dated that day Wilkinson informed the Secretary of War that he had decided to make the cantonment the “winter quarters” for the 2^nd Infantry Regiment” (record group). Major Williams had prepared for the return of the regiment by ordering the construction of new privy vaults in the ravines “which will be required on account of the increased number of Troops” (Williams Order Book 19). His order book also stops on October 10, suggesting that he was relieved of command upon that day. Major Williams, relieved of command, proceeded back up the Ohio River on October 17 to return to the eastern United States while General Wilkinson proceeded down river to conduct treaty negotiations with the Chickasaw and Choctaw.

As his final duty in the lower Ohio Valley, Major Williams used his engineering skills to lay out a new cantonment farther down river from Cantonment Wilkinson “on the Ohio about 13 Miles From its Junction with the Mississippi” on October 15. This location would have placed the new cantonment somewhere near the present-day location of Olmstead, Illinois. Williams described the setting of the new cantonment in a letter to Wilkinson as follows:

In obedience to your orders I have surveyed a spot on the NW side of this River which you were pleased to point out below the Chain of Rocks, with a view of making a Cantonment of 100 yards square…The River here forms a cave [cove?] behind a rocky point, when the water is sufficiently deep…to allow of a great number of Boats to lie in Safety out of the Current, with an excellent landing…The land lies on a bold Clift (sic). The height of which is…about the same of the Cantonment {Wilkinson] above [this place on the river] and that I know by actual measurement to 106 feet from the present low water mark of the River on the right of a line parallel to the river is a small ravine as to allow of a convenient Road, & as it is evident that the sides of this Ravine are formed of gravel & small stones, there can be no doubt of the practicability of this important communication with the River…There was no difficulty in laying out a most beautiful spot of 100 yd square…I [also] have the pleasure of informing you that directly to the Rear…I walked 200 yards on a fine rich soil where it seems almost certain that with slight Cultivation Vegetable Food might be produced for any number of men (Smith 1953:217-218, italics and bracketed quotes added).

This new cantonment, based on its relatively small size (100 yards square) obviously was intended to contain a smaller number of troops than those housed at Cantonment Wilkinson. As will be discussed below, Wilkinson apparently intended to move the military supplies contained at Cantonment Wilkinson to this new location once that cantonment had been officially abandoned. The smaller size of the cantonment also meant that a smaller force, in this case the two companies of artillery stationed at Cantonment Wilkinson in late 1801, could guard it.

The 2^nd Infantry regiment companies stationed at the mouth of the Tennessee River had been intended to accompany General Wilkinson back to Cantonment Wilkinson on October 13. For some reason, however, in his October 15 letter to Wilkinson describing the site of the new cantonment Major Williams noted that he was accompanied “by Capt. Greaton Commanding the present Cantonment [Wilkinson]” (Smith 1953:218). This suggests variously that either the 2^nd Regiment was still enroute to the cantonment a this time that Major Buell had been assigned to other duties, leaving Greaton in command or that Wilkinson had changed his mind about making Cantonment Wilkinson the winter quarters of the 2^nd Regiment. As neither Buell’s or Greaton’s order books have yet been found, it is not known if the 2^nd Regiment actually wintered at the cantonment. Caldwell (1949:26-27) noted that the post continued to be occupied on some level until at least April 1802.

Wilkinson visited the post on March 13, 1802, when its garrison appears to have been identical to that of August-October 1801. Troops present at that time included Captain Richard Greaton’s infantry company and two companies of artillery, one of which was Menninger’s while the other was most likely that of Hancock. Wilkinson issued an order that same day in regard to the two artillery companies that has long been understood as applying to Cantonment Wilkinson. In reality, Wilkinson appears to have been ordering the artillery companies to move to the new unnamed cantonment that Major Jonathon Williams had laid out farther down the Ohio River in October 1801:

Captain Menninger and the two companies of artillery will take post at the ‘Grand Chain’ as soon as possible, and are without delay to complete the proper defense of the Station…The Ordnance, Ammunition, Public Stores, and property of every species not necessary to Captain Greaton’s detachment will be invoiced and delivered to Captain Menninger and receipted for. Captain M. to pay due attention to the safekeeping of the articles intrusted (sic) to his care. (In Moyers 1931: 92).

As Menninger and the artillery companies already were at Cantonment Wilkinson, the order directing them to “take post at the ‘Grand Chain’” must have applied to another location. The exact location of the start of the Grand Chain apparently was a matter of some question during the early nineteenth century, with river guide Zadock Cramer placing it six miles below the location of Cantonment Wilkinson (Cramer 1811:141). Such a location would be in general agreement with Major William’s description of the new cantonment as being located about 13 miles from the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi.

The order dispatching the artillery units and “Public Stores” to the new cantonment appears to be associated with the final abandonment of Cantonment Wilkinson by the Army. Captain Greaton apparently also had orders to move from the post unless a “countermand [should] arise from superior authority”. Greaton and his company most likely abandoned the cantonment in April 1801, following the reduction in size of the Army. During this period two regiments (the 3^rd and 4^th) were eliminated, many officers resigned or were dismissed from the service, and the remaining officers and men were shifted into the 1^st and 2^nd Regiments.

Confirmation that the two artillery units may indeed have moved with the “Public Stores” to a new cantonment located down river from Cantonment Wilkinson is provided by a July 4^th, 1802, letter from a rather alarmed unnamed official in the Inspector’s Office in Washington, D.C., to Captain Daniel Bissell at Ft. Massac:

It appears by recent communication from Wilkinsonville & Tennessee that a new post has been erected between the first of these places & the mouth of the Ohio, & it is believed that there is considerable public property at these places and at Massac. The Secretary of War therefore directs that you make such disposition of your Company as may be necessary for the preservation of these places & the public property there either by posting Detachments at one or more of them or by removing the property to Massacor the new post and taking part [of your command] there [or] with your whole Company as may be deemed most conducive to the health & Comfort of the Troops and the preservation of the public property (MHS Military Records 1803-1805 Collection:25 italics added).

The above letter suggests that General Wilkinson may have established the new cantonment without government permission and that he also moved public property to this post similar to his October 13, 1801, order to Captain Menninger. Using the discretion given him in the Inspector General’s letter, Captain Bissell apparently decided to remove the government supplies from the new post as well as those at Tennessee River rather than occupy either of these locations as he remained the commanding officer of Ft. Massac until 180x (Caldwell 19xx xxx).

The last known account of Cantonment Wilkinson while it was still an Army post appeared in a book written by Fancois Marie Perrin du Lac. This French traveler appears to have stopped at Cantonment Wilkinson in April 1802, when the garrison had been reduced to Captain Richard Greaton’s infantry company. His very brief description indicates that Wilkinson Cantonment represented a port of entry into the United States where boat cargoes were checked and both boats and boatmen could be hired by travelers:

We next proceeded to Fort Massiac (sic), which was built by the United States in 1781 to protect the commerce of the Ohio from the savages. The fort is at present entirely destroyed. Ten miles lower is Wilkinsonville, where there is another fort. It is the residence of those employed by the custom-house, and is the only one which has maintained a garrison, destined rather to watch the entry of boats, than to exercise a military function. At this place we provided ourselves with a vessel suitable to the Mississippi, and skilful (sic) boatmen and three hours after our departure we arrived at the mouth of the Mississippi (Perrin du Lac 1807:43, emphasis added).

Post-Military History of Cantonment Wilkinsonville to 1830

It is unknown what became of the Euro-American civilian population surrounding Cantonment Wilkinson following the abandonment of the post in April 1802. However, there would have been little incentive for the sutlers, laundresses, boatmen, and others who depended on the army for living to stay in the area once the soldiers had departed. Most probably followed the various infantry and artillery units to other posts in both the Ohio and Mississippi River Valleys.

A Cherokee Indian village was present on the Kentucky side of the river opposite the cantonment in 1801 and probably into 1802 as well. People from this village moved across the river and occupied the abandoned cantonment buildings following the departure of the last of the soldiers. The Cherokee had done this same sort of thing in the past, occupying the abandoned buildings at nearby Ft. Massac when this post was temporarily closed by the Army in 1801 and 1802 (Caldwell 1949:21). The Cherokee appear to have remained in the area of Cantonment Wilkinson from at least 1802 until 1807 or 1808. The most detailed description of their village—and one of the most detailed descriptions of the post itself—come from the letters and journal of Thomas Rodney who visited the abandoned post in November, 1803. Rodney, a brother of one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, was on his way to accept a position as a federal judge in Mississippi Territory. In a letter to his son on November 16, 1803, Rodney described Wilkinsonville as follows:

We Called Indeed at Wilkerson (Sic) Ville where we found nobody but Indians Except one white woman who has an Indian husband. I visited the Chief Captⁿ Flea of whom I bo ^t Butter and Potatoes and Viewed his Stores of Corn and Beans and his Cornfield and Potato Patch & ^c . They have great Plenty of Corn beans & Potatoes & ^c and seem anxious to learn to Cultivate the Earth with more Skill and wish for white families among them to learn them Agriculture & Especially spinning weaving & ^c . Capt^{n F} Flea is the Chief that Resides there and about 200, Cherokees beside. The Chief is a respectable Indian and his Conduct and that of is wife were very cleaver (sic) and they all valued themselves on being friends to the Americans—They cultivated 30 or 40 Acres of corn this Year, and Beans, Potatoes & c beside—the Chief has a Negroman (sic) who he calls Bella who talks very good American—he is of the Indian Color not black and was very Intelligent—but my Interpreter was an Indian which they called a Spanish Indian to whom I gave a good warm vest for his attentive services—he told me his name was Tom Brown and that in fact he was only half Indian (Gratz 1919:41).

Rodney provided an even more detailed account of the Cherokee village at Wilkinsonville in his journal entry for November 7, 1803::

The morning being mild and clear we reached Wilkinson Ville on the NW shore by 12 o’clock. The Major had gone on shore some time before and met us there and hailed the boat to let us know we could git butter, vinison , and potatoes there and the wind blowing hard we cast ankor , and I went on shore where several Indians were waiting.

One of them was half Spaniard and could talk pritty good American I went on shore with him. He had plenty of vinison , and I took a ham that was very fine, etc. He took me to the chief, Captain Flea. Who is about 65 years old. I bought a lb. of butter of him and four cabages and a bushel of potatoes for one dollar and 3/8. He told me he did not know his age but shewed me he how old he was at the commencement of [General] Bradocks war [in Pennsylvania] and thereby I assertained his age. He shewed me his crop of corn and beans he had plant[ed] in his house and a large field they were gathering. The Spaniard Indian Tom Browninterpret[ed] what we said.

I went to the field to see it. There is 20 0r 30 acres in it and the corn very fine. I went to see the potatoes dug also. They had a large patch, and appeared to have been well tended and were fine. He sent his Negro man Billy who talks quite plain and his wife was already there to help dig them, scratch them up with their hands.

They got [some?] for me and when measured I paid the chief [with/] one dolar and they observed if we would let them have ploughs and a white family to shew them how to cultivate the land, they would sell much cheaper. Butter however was only the 1/8 of a dolar per pound. He had two very good horses and among them was a hundred head of cattle. The one we got 8 lb. of butter from had 8 fine calves and what we got was all churned while I stayed. Paid her 1 1/2 dollars for or one dollar in cash and 1/2 half dolar in flour.

There is 2 of 3 hundred logged houses in this town, built for our army in regular streets as a post or place of arms but they are all but a few uninhabited now and none occupied but by Indians. There is about 200 of them here but most of them hunting. We saw however 8 or 10 families and of the Cherikies and one Cherokies own chief Captain Coldwell. I shook hands with him but had no dealing with him. He was only here hunting and was incamped near the river but the rest lived in the best of the houses our army left. There was one white woman among them with 2 white children. She had an Indian husband and lived in the Negroe house and he told me he wanter her but she woud not have any but an Indian husband. She is a pretty likely woman (Zwixk and xx:165-166, all misspellings in original).

Rodney’s statement that Cantonment Wilkinson contained “2 of 3 hundred logged houses in this town, built for our army in regular streets as a post or place of arms” undoubtedly refers to the huts once occupied by squads of enlisted men. His additional comment that the Cherokee “lived in the best of the houses our army left” implies that larger structures, possibly those once occupied by officers or the Quarter Master, also existed at the post in 1803. In addition, his statement that the only white people consisted of a woman married to a Cherokee man and her two children indicates that the civilian population once associated with the cantonment had completely left by late 1803.

Ft Massac, which is located approximately 15 miles upstream from Cantonment Wilkinson, was still garrisoned at a company level during the time the Cherokee lived at the cantonment and the Army undoubtedly was aware of their presence at the former post. Possibly as an attempt to move them back across the Ohio River, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn authorized Captain Daniel Bissell on February 15, 1805, to allow Euro-American settlers to move into the abandoned post buildings:

If any person wishes to occupy any of the public buildings at Wilkinson-Ville, you may grant him the permission for the occupancy of one or more on condition of him keeping them in repair, and on condition of not selling spirituous liquors to the Indians (Moyers 1931:94).

The following month Dearborn authorized Bissell to “sell [any] sails and cordage at Wilkinson-ville or Massac”, implying that the Army may still have been using the harbor at Cantonment Wilkinson or that some boat-related supplies still remained at the post (Moyers 1931:94).

Dearborn’s attempt to attract Euro-American settlers to the former cantonment failed, at least in the short term, as travelers continued to encounter Cherokee at or near this location for the next several years. Christian Schultz, who stopped at the cantonment site in 1807, provided a limited description of the post that agreed with that of Rodney’s of four years before:

Sixteen miles below Massack (sic), you pass a station which has been called Wikersonville (sic), formerly Cedar Bluffs. This was a few years back the head-quarters of the commander in chief but from the unhealthiness of the place the garrison was moved back to Fort Massack. No white settlers are found at this place but since its abandonment by the army, it has been occupied by a few families of Cherokee Indians (Schultz 1810:3).

Flatboat traveler Dr. John Benford also noted the presence of Cherokee at the abandoned post in February, 1807:

Fort Wilkinsonville was erected and occupied six or seven years past…[it] is now the abode of a few Cherokee Indians only—inhabiting a few little huts—The fort and its appendages wrecked and tumbled to ruins—the same fate [before] long will ere long attend its cognomen [General Wilkinson] (Bedford 1919:56).

The Cherokee appear to have abandoned Cantonment Wilkinson in late 1807 or early 1808 as Samuel Cuming, who visited the abandoned post on May 21, 1808, did not see a Cherokee village at this location:

We rowed into Cedar Bluffs or Wilkinsonville, where we found an eddy making a fine harbor, and an ascent up a low cliff by sixty-two steps of squared logs, to a beautiful savannah or prairie of about 100 acres, with well frequented paths running across it in every direction. We observed on it, the ruins of the house of the commandant, and the barracks [which] were occupied by a small United States garrison, until a few years ago, when it was removed to Fort Massack (sic) some time after which, about two years ago the buildings were destroyed by the Indians (Cuming 1810:253-254).

Cuming suspected that Indians had created the numerous paths cutting through the prairie. As a result, he and his fellow travelers spent an uneasy night at on their boat below the abandoned cantonment due to “apprehension of an unwelcome visit from the original [Indian] lords of this country, recent vistages of whom we had seen in the prairie above us” (Cuming 1810:278).

The Cherokee may have abandoned the cantonment as the former post buildings gradually collapsed. Cuming and other travelers blamed the Cherokee for this destruction although it is not clear why the Indians would have destroyed these buildings if they were living in them. It also is possible that they abandoned the cantonment site due to an influx of Euro-American settlers into the area. By 1810, only three years after the last accounts of a Cherokee village at Cantonment Wilkinson, government census takers found 117 Euro-Americans—72 male and 57 female—living at this same location. These people had to have been either squatters or travelers as government land did not become available for purchase in Illinois until 1814. Four households also contained four separate individuals who appear to have been African-American slaves or indentured servants who had accompanied their owners into Illinois (Norton 1935:1936).

Wilkinsonville apparently declined rapidly as a town in the next decade as it is not listed as a separate entry in the 1820 census. Most of the 1810 settlers probably left to purchase farms in other parts of southern Illinois once land sales began in 1814. This movement may have been precipitated by the January 8, 1817, purchase of 597.56 acres within sections 2 and 3, T15S, R2E containing the abandoned cantonment site by Thomas Sloo and Gorham Worth. Thomas Sloo was the registrar of the Kaskaskia Land Office and his purchases of the tracts in sections 2 and 3 containing the abandoned site were only 2 of 90 land purchases that he made between 1815 and 1821. As such his purchase of the cantonment tract probably represents land speculation rather than actual settlement.

Missionary John Mason Peck encountered at least one resident in the declining settlement when his keelboat anchored for the night below Wilkinsonville on October 10, 1817.Peck’s description, although brief, provides several interesting details. Among these were that burned buildings existed at the site in 1817, that a nearby cemetery contained numerous graves, and that local people still recalled some details of the history of the post 15 years after its abandonment:

A short distance from where we are lying are the ruins of an old fort or encampment, where are the ruins of several houses which have been burned. Near by is a burying-ground, where are multitudes of graves. A young man informed us that it was a fortification, occupied in 1801, but evacuated on account of the sickly condition of the troops stationed there (Peck 1965:77).

It is not clear from Peck’s description if the burned houses he saw were he remains of the post buildings or later structures erected by civilians, although the former appears more likely. Peck referred to the abandoned post as having been either a “fort or encampment”, two very different types of military bases. Peck’s use of both terms to describe this base is incorrect (it had to be one or the other) and indicates a confusion on his part regarding military matters. A similar confusion may exist in the writings of other early nineteenth century travelers such as Perrin du Lac (1807) and Dr. John Benford (1919) who also referred to Wilkinsonville as a fort rather than a cantonment. Note also that other early nineteenth century travelers such as Thomas Rodney, who had some military experience, did not use the term “fort” to describe the abaondoned post (Gratz 1919:41).

Wilkinsonville may have consisted of no more than two or three structures at the time of Peck’s visit based on an 1821 Corps of Engineers (COE) map of the area. This map shows only three structures, some possible fields, and what appear to be several roads leading back from the river in the general area of the former location of the cantonment at the head of the Grand Chain of Rocks (Young et al. 1977: Chart No. 19).

The presence of only three structures on the 1821 COE map suggests that virtually all of the post structures had been dismantled by that time. One possibility is that local residents dismantled most of the abandoned buildings to obtain wood to sell to passing steamboats similar to what happened at nearby Ft, Massac. On November 17, 1816, Thomas Sloo wrote a letter to government officials in Washington describing the destruction of the military buildings at Ft. Massac by an unauthorized local man:

I am informed a few days past that the [unauthorized] person in the possession of Fort Massac has Injured the Buildings Very Materially by destroying & carrying off the flooring…[he] has Committed Serious depredations of the Buildings [and] has Laid Waste the farm & Garden by selling the Rails to the Master of the Steam Boat for fuel (Carter 1950:429).

In 1829 Captain Henry Shreve, the famous builder of the snag boat Heliopolis that cleared the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers of sunken trees, was awarded a contract from the U.S. government to clear a channel through the Grand Chain of Rocks. At least part of this work took place at or near Wilkinsonville. There appear to have been few or no structures left on the former cantonment grounds by that time as Shreve, rather than finding housing at this location, had to:

[gather] flatboats that had been fitted up as living-quarters for the laborers canoes from which the drilling in the rocks could be done mess boats and blacksmith boats. The stores of black powder were kept ashore…A large crew of men was needed for this work…. Eventually Shreve made a channel twelve hundred feet wide. He had removed 3,375 tons of rock. With this rock he then constructed a dam which ran out from the Illinois shore, deepening the channel (Dorsey 1941:155-156).

The wing dam constructed by Shreve in 1829 still exists today below the surface of the river. The northern end of the dam is attached to the shoreline in section 3, approximately one-half mile down river from the field containing the archaeological remains of Cantonment Wilkinson as currently defined (Figure 1-1). The dam extends out from the shoreline in the northern part of the river, making a gradual arc to the southwest. The statement by Shreve’s biographer that the “stores of black powder were kept ashore” raises the possibility that some portion of the Cantonment Wilkinson powder magazine, which most likely was a brick and stone structure, still existed in the late 1820s. If it did, Shreve may have repaired the magazine and used it to store the considerable amount of black powder that he would have needed to blast a channel through the Grand Chain.

Summary

Military and other records indicate that Cantonment Wilkinson existed from January 1801, to April 1802. The establishment of this post was the direct result of a late 18^th century crisis between the United States and France, with the cantonment intended to serve as a reserve base for the invasion of the Mississippi River Valley in the event of war. Although the crisis between France and the United States was resolved in the fall of 1800, plans for the establishment of the post went forward for unknown reasons. General James Wilkinson, after whom the post was named, may have conspired with either Aaron Burr or Alexander Hamilton (or both) to establish the post in anticipation of renewed hostilities with France following the 1800 election. The election of Republican Thomas Jefferson and the subsequent reduction in size of the Army, however, removed any practical need for the cantonment.

Cantonment Wilkinson initially consisted of a large encampment of tents occupied by approximately 1,000 soldiers. Hundreds of log huts distributed “in regular streets as a post or place of arms” rapidly replaced the tents as the soldiers built permanent quarters in the early months of 1801. Other facilities at the post included officer’s quarters, quartermaster and supply buildings a boatyard, powder magazine, and cemetery. The post reached a maximum strength of approximately 1,500 men in the summer of 1801 when General Wilkinson assembled a number of infantry and artillery units at the post for his review. The garrison suffered greatly from what appears to have been a combination of dysentery and malaria throughout 1801 with as many as 80 soldiers dying. Following the death of commanding officer Colonel Strong in August 1801, the 2^nd Infantry Regiment evacuated the post for a camp located at the mouth of the Tennessee River. Major Jonathan Williams was left in charge of a reduced garrison at the cantonment that consisted of one infantry company, two artillery units, and the sick. The 2^nd Regiment may have reoccupied the cantonment for “winter quarters” in October 1801, when General Wilkinson revisited the post and once again held a review. The cantonment was finally abandoned in April 1802 at which time Captain Richard Greaton commanded a reduced garrison consisting of his infantry company and two artillery units. The artillery units and an unknown quantity of supplies were removed that same month to a new cantonment located somewhere between Cantonment Wilkinson and the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.

Following the departure of the Army, Cherokee Indians moved into and lived in the abandoned cantonment buildings until at least 1807. The Cherokee had left by 1810 with a federal census taker recording that same year that the “town” of Wilkinsonville contained over 100 Euro-American settlers and four African-Americans. This settlement rapidly declined with only a few buildings left in 1821. Travelers who stopped at the former cantonment reported seeing various numbers of abandoned military buildings until at least 1817. There is a possibility that the famous river man and engineer Captain Henry Shreve may have repaired and used the powder magazine at the cantonment to store black powder in 1829-1830 although this has yet to be conclusively confirmed.